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Abstract 
Wagner and Berger (1985) uncovered a good deal of growth in 
sociological theory by distinguishing orienting strategies and unit 
theories from their concept of a theoretical research program --
the former because they grow so slowly, the latter because they 
grow only with respect to theory-data relations while theoretical 
research programs grow in several different ways. The resulting 
multidimensional model of theory growth has itself subsequently 
grown in three ways. (1) The elements of orienting strategies 
have been differentiated with respect to roles in, rates of, and 
reasons for growth. Working strategies play directive roles in 
growth and grow reciprocally with the growth of theories. 
Foundations, although fundamental to all inquiry, play a less 
immediate role in growth, grow only slowly, and are much less 
responsive to assessments of theory. (2) Theory-theory relations 
have been refined and elaborated, especially with respect to theory 
integration. (3) Theory-based empirical models have been 
differentiated from both theories and the empirical outcomes of 
theoretical and applied research. Such empirical models may be 
highly controlled, simple, and abstract (as they are in theoretical 
research) or less controlled, complex, and concrete (as they are in 
applied research). In either case, they typically combine elements 
of a number of the theories of a theoretical research program and 
are the links between these theories and empirical outcomes of 
theoretical and applied research. The present paper describes all 
three changes in the multidimensional model of theory growth. 
These changes lead to changes in the conception of a theoretical 
research program that should make it a more powerful instrument for 
understanding the growth of theories that is currently taking place 
in our field. 
I . INTRODUCTION 
The present paper has two goals. The first is to bring 
together in a single, comprehensive statement a number of 
scattered developments in the understanding of theoretical 
research programs. The second is to reformulate our definition 
of such programs in the light of some of these developments. 
Building on the pioneering work of Imre Lakatos (1968, 
1970), we have argued in a series of previous formulations that 
the theoretical research program is the most appropriate unit for 
the analysis of the growth of theory (Berger 1974; Berger and 
Zelditch 1993; Wagner 1984; Wagner and Berger 1985; Wagner and 
Berger 1986). A theoretical research program (TRP) was defined 
by Wagner and Berger (1985) as a set of interrelated theories, 
together with a body of theoretical research that tests, refines, 
and extends these theories and a body of applied research 
grounded in them. TRP's are a distinct level of theoretical 
analysis. They differ both from individual theoretical 
arguments, such as Emerson's theory of power-dependence relations 
(Emerson 1972a, b) or Davis and Moore's theory of stratification 
(Davis and Moore 1945), which Wagner and Berger called unit 
theories, and from overarching metatheoretical structures such as 
Parsons' theory of action (Parsons 1951) or Alexander and 
Colomy's neofunctionalism (Alexander and Colomy 1990), which 
Wagner and Berger called orienting strategies. The distinction 
was made for the purpose of understanding differences in roles in 
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and rates of growth. Orienting strategies appear to be 
relatively stable. If one is looking for growth of theory, to 
focus on such strategies obscures the amount of growth taking 
place in a field. Unit theories do change, but attention to 
growth at this level focusses largely on theory-data relations. 
Growth occurs at this level, but it is only one kind of growth. 
There are other kinds of growth that arise from theory-theory 
relations. Furthermore, even at the theory-data level it is 
widely understood that change depends on theoretical alternatives 
(Popper 1959; Lakatos 1968, 1970). That is, growth again depends 
on a context of theory-theory as much as theory-data relations. 
For both reasons, theory-theory relations are important to 
understanding growth. But Wagner and Berger (1985) pointed out 
that there are several different kinds of theory-theory relations 
that grow in different ways. Hence, they proposed a 
multidimensional model of growth. It is this multidimensional 
model of growth that is formulated by the concept of a TRP. It 
differs both from the unidimensional, cumulative model of growth 
of positivism (e.g., Hempel 1965; Nagel 1961; Popper 1959) and 
models of discontinuous change of such post-positivists as Kuhn 
(1962, 1970). 
But the multidimensional model of growth has itself grown 
since originally formulated. First, there have been substantial 
changes in the way we think about orienting strategies and their 
relation to theory growth (Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch 1989, 
1992; Berger and Zelditch 1993; Zelditch 1991, 1992). Second, 
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there have been refinements in our understanding of theory-theory 
relations (Berger and Zelditch 1993). Third, there have been 
changes in the way we think about the relation of theories to 
relevant bodies of theoretical and applied research (Berger and 
Zelditch 1985; section iv of the present paper). It is the fact 
that this work is fragmented and scattered in so many places that 
motivates our first goal, to bring it together in a single 
comprehensive statement. It is the fact that our understanding 
of the relation of theory growth to metatheory-theory and theory-
data relations has changed so much that motivates our second 
goal, which is to redefine the concept of a TRP. Section ii of 
the present paper describes changes in our thinking about 
metatheory-theory relations; section iii describes refinements in 
our understanding of theory-theory relations; section iv 
describes changes in our thinking about theory-data relations; 
finally, our conclusion (section v) offers a reformulated 
definition of a TRP. Throughout, because of our deeper knowledge 
and understanding of the case, we draw heavily, though not 
exclusively, on examples from the development of expectation-
states theory. We believe, however, that our results apply more 
generally to TRPs that currently are being developed in the 
different areas of sociology. 
II. ORIENTING STRATEGIES AND GROWTH 
Orienting strategies, such as functionalism, social 
behaviorism, rational choice theory, or postmodernism, are sets 
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of metatheoretioal concepts, presuppositions, and directives that 
guide the construction of theory and the conduct of inquiry. The 
elements of orienting strategies range from very broad, general 
presuppositions such as ontologies and epistemologies to 
specific, concrete prescriptions such as Durkheim's doctrine of 
emergence (Durkheim 1951) or the Hempel-Oppenheim-Popper paradigm 
of explanation (Hempel 1965; Popper 1959). Although they are 
fundamental frames of reference in terms of which specific 
theories are constructed, Wagner and Berger (1985) did not 
include orienting strategies in theoretical research programs. 
Wagner and Berger's goal was to analyze growth. Orienting 
strategies appeared to be very stable. In particular, 
ontologies, epistemologies, and such other elements as the 
fundamental aims of inquiry seemed to change only very slowly, if 
at all. Including orienting strategies in TRP's therefore tends 
to obscure the amount and nature of theoretical growth in a 
field. 
But closer study of the elements of which orienting 
strategies are made up suggests that they differ in nature, 
function, and rates of growth (Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch 1989, 
1992; Berger and Zelditch 1993; Zelditch 1991; Zelditch 1992). 
Some are quite stable, as the fundamental aims of inquiry, 
ontologies, and epistemologies appear to be. But some change 
frequently, even grow, as the concept of a "state-organizing 
process" grew with the evolution of expectation-states theory 
(Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch 1989, 1992), or as the concept of a 
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theoretical research program itself has grown (Berger, 1974; 
Wagner and Berger 1985; Berger and Zelditch 1993). What are 
these elements? 
Anatomy. From the point of view of their nature, function, and 
rates of growth it seems most useful to distinguish the very 
broad, abstract presuppositions which constitute the foundations 
of orienting strategies from the specific, concrete directives of 
the working strategy that more immediately guides the actual 
construction of theory, conduct of inquiry, and theory growth. 
From the point of view of the relation of the elements of 
orienting strategies to each other it is useful further to 
distinguish aims from presuppositions and directives, and 
substance from method. Together, these distinctions yield an 
anatomy of orienting strategies made up of five kinds of 
elements. (See Figure 1.) 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
The foundations of a strategy include its fundamental aims 
and its methodological and substantive presuppositions, which we 
will refer to as methodological and substantive foundation 
positions. The aims of a strategy include both its substantive 
objectives, for example the focus of expectation-states theories 
on interactor theories (Berger, Eyre, and Zelditch 1989), and its 
methodological objectives, for example expectation-states 
theory's generalizing orientation (Berger, Zelditch, and Anderson 
1972) . Its methodological foundation positions are the most 
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*Takeri from Berger and Zelditch, 1993. 
general, abstract methodological presuppositions of a strategy. 
They typically consist of basic assumptions about what there is, 
i.e., ontology, and how we know what there is, i.e., 
epistemology. Substantive foundation positions are the most 
general, abstract substantive presuppositions of a strategy. 
They typically consist of basic assumptions about the nature of 
the actor, action, and social order, such as the agency of the 
actor, the rationality of action, and the relation between 
consensus and coercion. 
Working strategies, on the other hand, are much more 
specific and concrete. Methodological working strategies are 
more specific, concrete concepts and principles dealing with the 
nature of theory, of empirical inquiry, the logic of explanation, 
criteria for assessing theory, and the nature of theoretical 
growth. The Hempel-Oppenheim-Popper paradigm of explanation 
(Hempel 1965; Popper 1959) is a methodological working strategy, 
as is Blumer's naturalistic method of symbolic interactionism 
(Blumer 1969). So is the more specific methodological strategy, 
underlying expectation-states theory: Ideas such as the 
importance of abstraction (from diverse particular instances); 
the search for unitary processes through simplifying the 
complexity of concrete particulars in order to achieve the 
regularity desired by a generalizing orientation; the use of 
formalization to increase the analytic power of theory; and of 
experiment to increase the power of theoretical research to test, 
refine, and generalize theories. 
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Finally, substantive working strategies are more specific, 
concrete concepts and principles dealing with the what, rather 
than the how to, of theories. They conceptualize the basic 
nature of actors, action, and society in more concrete terms and 
direct the investigator to solvable problems and the concepts and 
principles that will solve them. Fararo and Skvoretz's E-state 
structuralism (Fararo and Skvoretz 1986), Merton's paradigm of 
functionalism (Merton 1949), Lawler, Ridgeway, and Markovsky's 
structural social psychology (Lawler, Ridgeway, and Markovsky 
1993), and expectation-states theory's "state-organizing 
processes" (Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch 1989, 1992) are all 
substantive working strategies of this kind. See also Turner 
1993, which illustrates the combination of both substantive and 
methodological working strategies, and Wilier and Markovsky 1993, 
which illustrates both kinds of working strategy in combination 
with the development of a TRP. 
Roles in Growth. The elements of orienting strategies differ not 
only in nature but in function. Working strategies direct in an 
immediate sense (see the bottom of Figure 1). For example, the 
substantive working strategy underlying expectation states 
theories conceptualizes social interaction as a state-organizing 
process (Berger Wagner, and Zelditch 1989, 1992). Because 
interaction is a process, the strategy directs an investigator 
using it to ask how and under what conditions a process is 
activated. The answers to questions of this kind constitute the 
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theories of a program. In status characteristic theory a valued, 
collective task is one of the (several) features that activates 
the status generalization process (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch 
1966; Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch 1977). The task or 
goal of co-oriented action is thought of as a critical element 
defining the situation of action. But the state-organizing 
strategy distinguishes the situation of action, such as goals, 
from the larger social framework, i.e., enduring, trans-
situational, consensual elements, such as pre-given norms, 
values, beliefs, social networks, and social categories, within 
which situations of action occur. By this distinction theorists 
using this kind of working strategy are directed to also ask what 
elements of the pre-given social framework enter into the 
particular process in question and how and under what conditions 
the elements of the social framework are accessed. Diffuse 
status characteristics constitute the social framework in the 
theory of status characteristics. Referential structures are the 
social framework in the theory of distributive justice (Berger, 
Zelditch, Anderson, and Cohen 1972). How they are accessed is 
described by salience principles in the theory of status 
characteristics (Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch 1977), by 
spread of status value principles in the theory of justice 
(Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, and Cohen 1972). Additional 
directives derive from the fact that behavior in state-organizing 
processes is governed by situationally stable states that evolve 
in the course of interaction, but, once evolved, are relatively 
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stable so long as the conditions of the situation do not change. 
Hence, a theorist using the working strategy is also directed to 
ask what behaviors are and are not determined by the states and 
how the states, once formed are translated into observable 
behavior. In the status characteristics theory, the states are 
self-other expectation states, the behaviors are the action 
opportunities, performances, reward actions, and influence that 
make up the observed power prestige order, and the theory-
formulates principles such as that of organized subsets to 
describe how information about status valued characteristics of 
actors in the situation combine to define expectation states and 
the basic expectation assumption to describe how states are 
translated into behavior (Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch 
1977). 
Foundations play a less immediate role in the construction 
of theory. What they do is provide the premises that justify 
working strategies, which, in turn, realize these premises at a 
more concrete level. Thus, the experimental methods of 
expectation-states theory are justified by premises derived from 
the aims and presuppositions of a generalizing orientation to 
sociology. The aim is lawlike understanding of social behavior. 
It is presupposed that such lawlike understanding is general. 
This implies that laws have multiple interpretations. For 
example, that a status characteristic created in the laboratory, 
if it satisfies the same criteria of definition as race, gender, 
and occupation, should behave in the same way as race, gender, 
9 
and occupation. Therefore, it should not matter to understanding 
the principles of the theory of status characteristics what 
status characteristic one studies. A choice of a situation in 
which to test the principles of the theory is therefore a 
pragmatic question of how to achieve the most control and most 
precise measurement conditions. Experimental methods would be 
difficult to justify without the aims of a generalizing strategy 
or the presuppositions that abstract knowledge is possible, or 
that wholes are dissoluble into parts that are relevant and parts 
that are not, or the presupposition that in tests of theories it 
is the general principle that is important rather than any 
particular, concrete effect (Berger, Zelditch, and Anderson 
1972) . 
Rates of Growth. But from the point of view of understanding the 
growth of theory, the most important way in which foundations 
differ from working strategies is in their respective rates of 
and reasons for change. Foundations seem to change very very 
slowly, if at all. It is true that new ones appear all the time, 
e.g., post-positivism (Alexander 1982; Kuhn 1962), post-
structuralism (Foucault 1972), and post-modernism (Lyotard 1984; 
Rorty 1979) . But often they do not seem to displace or even 
modify old ones. And such changes as do take place do not seem 
to be responses to the assessment of theories. Working 
strategies, on the other hand, change relatively rapidly and 
changes seem to respond to the assessment of theories. 
10 
Thus, the state-organizing conception of a social framework 
defining a situation of action, and its distinction of the social 
framework from the situation of action itself, only gradually 
emerged in expectation-states theory. The concept was in fact 
present in even the earliest expectation states theory, the 
evaluation/expectations theory (Berger 1958), but in a very 
simple form (among the conditions defining the scope of the 
theory) and without any recognition of how general an idea it 
was. In the theory of status characteristics (Berger, Cohen, and 
Zelditch 1966; Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch 1977), a 
social framework, the diffuse status characteristic, was the most 
important concept of the theory, but still without recognition 
that some form of social framework defines any state-organizing 
process. A social framework appears again, in the form of the 
referential structure, in the theory of distributive justice 
(Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, and Cohen 1972), but again without 
explicit recognition of how general the importance of a social 
framework is. It was relatively late reflection on these three 
theories in the course of further extension of the strategy of 
the program to other phenomena that led to the abstraction, 
generalization, and explication of the idea of a social framework 
as a fundamental element of any state-organizing process (Berger, 
Eyre, and Zelditch 1989; Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch 1992). 
Nor did we begin with a concept of a theoretical research 
program anything like the present concept. In fact, expectation-
states theory as a program began with the goal of cumulative 
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growth as it was commonly understood in the fifties. It had a 
rather simple linear modal of growth in mind in which a sequence 
of theoretical arguments grows ever more empirically adequate and 
ever more comprehensive in scope, later theories therefore 
displacing earlier theories. But this model was consistent 
neither with our own experience of theory growth nor with our 
reading of the experience of other sociologists. Our model of 
growth therefore began itself to undergo growth. The first 
change was to recognize that "expectation-states theory" was not 
a theory, but a theory program consisting of a number of 
interrelated theories (Berger 1974). But this first 
reformulation focussed attention only on the anatomy of programs, 
without differentiating different patterns of growth. A 
multidimensional model of growth did not emerge until Wagner and 
Berger 1985, undergoing further change ever since (Berger, 
Wagner, and Zelditch 1989, 1992; Berger and Zelditch 1993; 
Zelditch 1991, 1992). 
But "growth" may include changes in the use of, as well as 
reformulation of, a strategy. A notable case of a strategy that 
has been widely quoted but seldom used is Merton's paradigm of 
functionalism (Merton 1949). Possibly this is because it is 
difficult to realize empirically Merton's directive to formulate 
the net balance of functions. (There are functional theories, 
such as Davis and Moore 1945, but they do not realize Merton's 
directive to formulate the net balance of functions.) 
Contemporary functionalisms, such as Alexander's 
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neofunctionalism, seem altogether to have abandoned Merton's 
paradigm (e.g., Alexander and Colomy 1990). But abandoning a 
working strategy because it cannot be realized in actual 
theoretical products is a form of growth. 
It is important not to be misled by the fact that some 
elements of metatheory do change in response to assessments of 
theory. We do not mean to argue that the relation of working 
strategies to data is like the relation of theories to data. 
Working strategies are as metatheoretical, and hence as 
irrefutable, as foundation positions are. They do not change and 
grow because they are directly assessed by such criteria as 
corroboration, precision, generality, and analytic or 
instrumental power. Such criteria are used to assess theories, 
not strategies. Working strategies grow not because they are 
directly assessed by the same criteria as theories but because 
they are more or less fertile and their uses in the construction 
of theories are more or less fruitful. They cannot be assessed 
directly. But they can be assessed indirectly, in terms of their 
utility as directives in constructing theories. It is because 
they are used to construct theories, and because theories can be 
assessed by criteria like corroboration, precision, generality, 
and power, that working strategies change and grow. The 
experience of using them affects but is also reciprocally 
affected by the successes and failures of the theories they are 
used to construct. 
That foundation positions and working strategies differ in 
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roles in, rates of, and grounds for change suggests a need to 
rethink Wagner and Berger's (1985) sharp separation of orienting 
strategies from TRP's. Their purpose was to define a unit most 
appropriate for understanding the growth of theory. For this 
purpose, foundation positions do in fact appear unsuited. The 
broadest, most general aims, concepts, and presuppositions of 
orienting strategies, though they play a fundamental role as the 
foundations of all inquiry, play a much less immediate role in 
the growth of particular theories, they change very very slowly, 
if they change at all, and such changes as do occur do not seem 
to be responses to assessments of theory. On the other hand, 
working strategies play an immediate directive role in, and grow 
reciprocally with, the growth of theory. One would therefore 
like to conclude that foundation positions should be excluded but 
working strategies included in a unit defined for the purpose of 
understanding growth. But this more differentiated treatment of 
orienting strategies would not be feasible if orienting 
strategies were tightly integrated systems of thought. We 
therefore need to consider the nature of the relations among the 
elements that make up orienting strategies. 
Relations Among Elements of an Orienting Strategy. But, because 
of the diversity of the elements of which orienting strategies 
are composed, one should not expect to find that such 
metatheoretical structures are tightly integrated systems, and 
they are not. Clusters of entailment, where they exist, do 
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create one kind of integration. For example, if one is committed 
to the aim of general knowledge of social behavior, one is at the 
same time committed to abstraction, because wholes are unique; to 
dissolubility of wholes, without which abstraction is not 
possible; and to the search for regularities, without which 
lawlike phenomena, hence general knowledge, do not exist. But 
such clusters of entailment are the exception, not the rule. The 
more common relation among elements of an orienting strategy 
might best be described as "compatibility." State-organizing 
processes, the working strategy of expectation-states theories, 
are compatible with the aims of a generalizing orientation, but 
so is exchange theory, one of the working strategies of rational 
choice theory (e.g., Coleman 1990; Hechter 1987). Compatibility 
is a one-to-many, not a one-to-one relation. Even compatibility 
creates a kind of integration, because it has its limits: Some 
ideas are incompatible. For example, a commitment to empirical 
inquiry requires that one believe that there is a reality 
external to the observer, however veiled one's knowledge of it. 
Any such strategy is incompatible with a radical relativism such 
as Rorty's (1979) or Maines and Molseed's (1986). But more 
commonly a one-to-many relation admits many possible combinations 
of elements. A working strategy may consist of a single major 
principle, e.g., that actors maximize utility (Coleman 1990; 
Fararo and Skvoretz 1993; Hechter 1987) or a set of principles, 
e.g., Merton's paradigm of manifest and latent functions (1949). 
Where it is a set of principles, they may be more but may also be 
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less integrated and still constitute a workable strategy. There 
may be many working strategies compatible with any one particular 
foundation position. For example, rational choice theory and 
behavioral exchange theory, though they differ over the status of 
theoretical unobservables, share a generalizing orientation, as 
well as a large number of other orientations, in common. (Cf. 
Coleman 1990, and/or Hechter 1987, to Emerson 1972a, b, and/or 
Homans 1961.) At the same time, one strategy may easily divide 
into conflicting versions over a particular foundation issue 
while remaining very similar in other respects, as Chicago and 
Iowa Interactionisms did over method. (Cf. Blumer 1969, to Kuhn 
and McPartland 1954.) And eclectic combinations of foundation 
elements are common, as for example Parsons' rather unique 
combination of elements from functionalism and the theory of 
action (Parsons 1951). 
Thus, closer study of orienting strategies suggests a need 
to differentiate foundation positions from working strategies. 
Working strategies play so immediate a role in growth and grow so 
reciprocally with the growth of theory that they should be 
thought of as elements of TRP's. On the other hand, because they 
play a less immediate role in growth, change so slowly, and 
change for reasons that are less responsive to assessments of 
theories, foundation positions should be differentiated from the 
concept of a TRP. It would not be possible to reformulate the 
concept of a TRP in this way if orienting strategies were tightly 
integrated systems of thought, but they are in fact very loosely 
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integrated. 
III. SETS OF INTERRELATED THEORIES 
The core component of a theoretical research program is a 
set of interrelated theories. Theories within and between 
programs are interrelated in many ways. But which kinds of 
interrelations represent growth and development? This is the 
problem which Wagner and Berger address in their paper, "Do 
Sociological Theories Grow?" (1985). On the basis of their 
analysis of the anatomy of a number of ongoing theoretical 
research programs, they proposed that we distinguish five types 
of relations within and between programs -- elaboration, 
proliferation, variation, competition, and integration that 
represent different types of theory growth. It is extremely 
important to recognize that they also represent different types 
of goals and strategies that are available to the theorist in 
developing research programs. 
Subsequent to Wagner and Berger's research, we have analyzed 
additional research programs, Berger and Zelditch 1993, and on 
the basis of this analysis we have further elaborated and refined 
our conceptions of these inter-theory relations. We present 
these elaborated conceptions here, making use of examples from 
the expectation states program. What do each of these inter-
theory relations mean? 
Elaboration. We say of two theories, Tx and T2, that T2 is an 
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elaboration of Tx if T2 is more comprehensive or has greater 
analytic power or has greater empirical grounding than Tx 
provided that Tx and T2 share the same family of concepts and 
principles and that they are addressed to the same general 
explanatory domains. 
T2 may become more comprehensive than Tx by either an 
expansion of the scope conditions of Tx or an expansion of the 
explanatory domain dealt with by T^ Both types of growth are to 
be found in the status characteristics branch of the expectation 
states program. The scope conditions of the initial status 
characteristics theory, Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch 1966, 1972, 
was restricted to two actors discriminated by a single status 
characteristic. Subsequent formulations, Berger and Fisek 1974, 
Berger et al 1977, extended the scope of the theory to multi-
actor situations in which actors may possess any number of 
discriminating or equating characteristics or sets of 
characteristics. Similarly, while the explanatory focus of these 
theories was originally restricted to the development and 
organization of power and prestige behaviors, more recent work 
has extended the explanatory focus to include processes of 
legitimation and delegitimation and dominating and propitiating 
behaviors associated with these processes, Ridgeway and Berger 
1986. 
Increases in the analytic power of the theories in a program 
is most often realized through formalization of the theory. 
While the original status characteristics theory was not 
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formalized, for subsequent versions a graph theoretical 
formulation has been developed. This allows the analysis of an 
extremely larger number of different types of status situations, 
the derivation of general theorems about these status situations, 
and with the estimation of relevant parameters the generation of 
interval ordering behavioral predictions in specific status 
situations (Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch 1977; Humphreys 
and Berger 1981). It is also the case that starting with the 
initial formulation each subsequent formulation has been able to 
account for an increasing body of empirical results. 
Elaboration is a basic form of growth in research programs 
and is driven by a combination of goals. These include 
theoretical -- expanding the explanatory domain of a theory and 
enlarging its scope of application; analytical -- formalizing a 
theoretical structure and developing models; and empirical --
increasing the empirical consequences of a theory and its 
corroboration. 
Proliferation. We say of two theories, Tx and T2 that T2 is a 
proliferant of Tx if T2 enlarges the range of application of the 
ideas and principles in T1 to social phenomena beyond the 
original domain or the original set of problems (within a domain) 
addressed by Tx. Through proliferations, concepts, and 
theoretical principles from Tx are carried over to T2, often with 
significant modifications. In addition, new and auxiliary 
concepts and principles typically are introduced to deal with the 
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specific issues of the new domain and the new set of problems. 
Thus while sharing major concepts and principles, proliferants 
will also differ in the concepts and principles that they employ. 
Unlike the situation where T2 is an elaboration of Tx and where T2 
may be used to predict what Tx predicts and more, in the case 
where T2 is a proliferant of T1# T2 may make few if any specific 
predictions about the problems dealt with by Tx. In this sense, 
the status characteristics theory and the status value theory of 
distributive justice, Berger et al 1972, are proliferants. In 
both theories the notion of expectation is central and while the 
former is concerned with the formation of expectations for 
performance the latter is concerned with the formation of 
expectations for rewards. Key concepts of the distributive 
justice theory are identical to those in the status 
characteristics theory including the ideas of the possession, 
association, and relevance of status elements and the concept of 
a diffuse status characteristic. But the explanatory focus of 
the status value theory of distributive justice which is on how 
actors can determine that the allocation of rewards is just and 
unjust is different from that of the status characteristics 
theory. And there are concepts and principles in the former 
which are not in the latter that have been introduced to deal 
with the unique concerns of the justice theory. 
Proliferants may evolve in different ways -- with one theory 
spinning off from a second (or two theories each spinning off 
from each other) as is the case of the status value theory of 
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distributive justice and the status characteristics theory, or 
with two or more theories differentiating from some common 
formulation as is true of the exchange networks branch and the 
behavioral-structure branch (Cook, Molm, Yamagishi 1993) in 
Emerson's power and dependence program, Emerson 1962, 1972a, 
1972b. 
Proliferants represent "theoretical leaps" in the growth of 
a program. By these theoretical leaps existing concepts and 
principles in combination with new and auxiliary concepts and 
principles are used to extend the range of the program in terms 
of scope and domain. 
Variants. We say that two theories, Tx and T2 are variants of 
each other if they employ concepts and principles from the same 
family of concepts and principles and if they are addressed to 
similar explanatory problems. Variant theories are closely 
related and often apply to similar if not identical scope 
conditions. They differ, however, in that they make use of one 
or more different mechanisms to describe how the relevant process 
operates. In the expectations status program a set of status 
theories developed by Freese and Cohen (1973), Hembroff (1982), 
and Hembroff, Martin, and Sell (1981) are theoretical variants of 
status characteristics theories. They use concepts and 
principles similar to those of the status characteristics theory. 
They have similar scope conditions, and they have the identical 
explanatory focus -- both are concerned with how power and 
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prestige orders evolve and are organized in interpersonal 
situations. These theories differ from the status 
characteristics theory in that they propose a balancing mechanism 
in the processing of multiple items of status information. By a 
balancing mechanism, actors eliminate status information so that 
they are confronted with univalent information in forming self-
other expectations states (see also Lenski 1966). In contrast, 
the status characteristics theories proposes that actors combine 
multiple items of status information in a manner described by the 
"principle of organized subsets" in forming their expectations 
(Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch 1977). 
Variants are often constructed by theorists in an effort to 
get more precise knowledge of how a process works. This strategy 
involves constructing theories so that, for specified conditions, 
they generate conflicting predictions. This has occurred in the 
case of the controversy over whether status information is 
combined or balanced. (See Webster and Driskell 1979, Hembroff 
1982, Berger et al 1992. For a general analysis and assessment 
of these variant status theories, see Balkwell 1991.) 
The outcome of research on variant theories may be that one 
theory displaces the other or an integration is formulated that 
describes the conditions under which each holds. In either case 
there is an advance in theoretical knowledge. Thus variants 
contribute to theory growth by providing precise knowledge on 
alternative conceptions of a specific process that are formulated 
within a single family of concepts and principles. 
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Competitors. We say two theories Tx and T2 are competitors if 
their structures involve different concepts and theoretical 
principles and if at some point they address the same explanatory 
problems. 
Competitors may differ in fundamental ways, focussing on 
different behaviors, different explanatory factors, and being 
addressed to distinct explanatory phenomena. However, if for 
some particular explanatory problems they confront each other 
with conflicting predictions, their relations to each other can 
be important to theory growth. Within the expectation states 
program competition with status characteristics theories have 
appeared in a number of cases. This is particularly true in the 
competition between dominance theories represented by Mazur 
(1985) and Lee and Ofshe (1981) and the status characteristic 
theory dealing with status cues (Berger et al 1986) and that 
dealing with legitimation processes (Ridgeway and Berger 1986). 
These theories differ in concepts and principles with the former 
focussing on mechanisms of competition, stress, and deference-
demanding behaviors while the latter focuses on the role of 
expectation and status value processes in accounting for the 
attainment of power and prestige positions. 
Conflicts between competitors normally are more difficult to 
resolve than those between variants and competitors can exist 
side by side for long periods of time. This is due not only to 
their differences in conceptual structure but also to the fact 
that they often address disparate problems in addition to those 
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they have in common. Nevertheless resolutions can occur. For 
specific explanatory problems one theory may come to dominate the 
second, and it is also possible that concepts and principles from 
each theory are rendered into some third formulation as part of a 
theoretical integration (see below). Thus competitors contribute 
to growth of theory by providing knowledge on alternative 
conceptions of some specific process or of some specific set of 
theoretical problems where these conceptions are drawn from 
different families of concepts and principles. 
Integration. Integration is a relation between three theories, 
T-L, T2, and T3 where T3 "consolidates many of the ideas found in Tx 
and T2 in a single formulation, usually suggesting 
interrelationships between these ideas" (Wagner and Berger 1985). 
We can distinguish different types of integration. To begin 
with there are integrations of variants and integrations of 
proliferants where in both cases the theories are from the same 
family of concepts and principles. In the case of variants a 
common mode of relating the theories to each other is through 
conditionalization. which involves specifying conditions under 
which the process described by each variant operates. While no 
such formulation currently exists within the expectation states 
program, it is reasonable to imagine that one can be constructed 
which integrates the variant balancing and combining status 
theories by stipulating conditions under which actors balance 
multiple items of status information, e.g., those involving high 
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levels of social-emotional activity, and conditions under which 
actors combine such information, e.g., those involving strong 
emphasis on task and goal oriented activities. 
A common mode of integrating proliferants is to describe the 
interrelation of the different processes described by each of the 
theories involved. In the expectation states program, this is 
done in the theory of reward expectations (Berger et al 1985) 
which partially integrates status characteristics theories and 
the status value theory of distributive justice by describing how 
both expectations for performances and expectations for rewards 
are formed simultaneously in status situations. 
We also distinguish integration of competitors and, 
following the analysis of Fararo and Skvoretz (1993) what we may 
call the integration of "independents," where in both cases the 
theories differ in their basic conceptual structures. In the 
former case, the two theories also compete on common explanatory 
problems; while in the latter case the explanatory problems of 
the theories are fully distinct, and they do not compete on 
common problems. Since competitors and independents employ 
concepts and principles from different conceptual families, a 
major task in the integration of such theories is to render ideas 
and principles from the two different theories into the common 
language of still a third theory. Just this type of rendering of 
ideas from competing theories takes place in Jasso's integration 
of equity theory (Adams 1965; Homans 1961) and the status value 
theory of distributive justice (Berger et al 1972) that leads to 
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her formulation of a specific justice evaluation function (Jasso 
1978). Using a similar strategy that involves independent 
theories, Fararo and Skvoretz (1987) have integrated 
Granovetter's theory of weak ties, 1973, and Blau's theory of 
differentiation, 1977, in terms of biased net theory. 
Integrations represent major steps in theory growth. 
However, it is important to recognize that they may also entail 
losses in that ideas and principles in Tx or T2 may not be 
captured in T3 but may yet be useful for other purposes. Thus, 
the reward expectations theory (Berger et al 1985) in the 
expectation-states program, though it integrates some ideas from 
the theory of status characteristics and the theory of 
distributive justice, does not incorporate ideas on the "spread 
of status value" which are an important part of the latter 
theory. (The same is true of Jasso's integration of equity 
theory and status value theory of distributive justice.) As a 
consequence, the status value theory of distributive justice is 
not fully replaced by the theory of reward expectations. More 
generally, this suggests that there may not always be "strict 
replaceability" when later theories build on earlier theories in 
the growth of a research program (Laudan 1976, 1977). In turn, 
this fact stresses the importance of treating the theoretical 
research program as the unit of analysis in understanding growth. 
IV. THEORY BASED EMPIRICAL MODELS 
Wagner and Berger (1985) did not distinguish between 
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empirical models based on the theories in a program and the 
results of empirical research involving these models. One of the 
ways in which programs are evaluated is on the basis of their 
theory based models. Therefore to understand their growth (or 
non-growth), it is necessary to conceptualize these models as 
distinctive components of programs. The empirical outcomes of 
research involving these models, however, have significance 
across different programs and therefore are not distinctive 
components of a program. 
The theories in a program are often abstract and general in 
nature, and simple in structure. Theory based empirical models 
are constructed to apply these abstract and general theories to 
describe and explain specific events and phenomena in specific 
situations. 
Typically, the construction of theoretically based empirical 
models involves a number of critical identifications and 
stipulations. To begin with, their construction involves the 
identification or interpretation of abstract elements in the 
different theories of the program with particular aspects of the 
situation and phenomena that is being modeled, e.g., gender as a 
diffuse status characteristic. Second, their construction 
involves the specification of theoretically relevant special 
conditions, under which the model holds, e.g., the nature of 
prior expectations in the situation. Third, their construction 
involves the identification of one or more sets of observational 
techniques and procedures that will provide information that is 
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necessary in the application of the model. A fourth feature of 
such models, which is of interest to us, is that their 
construction often involves the interrelation of theoretical 
elements from different parts of a research program (or from 
parts of different programs), because of the complexity of 
particular situations. 
A Model for Power and Status Processes. We illustrate these 
features of a theoretically based empirical model by considering 
one that is based on the expectation states program that has 
recently been formulated by Michael Lovaglia (1992). Lovaglia 
was interested in how power and exchange behaviors are 
transformed into status relations in interpersonal situations. 
The interrelation for power and status is of course an old and 
very general problem in sociology. Lovaglia, however, restricted 
his research to a set of highly specific contexts. This he did 
by formulating the problem as that of describing how power and 
exchange behaviors as studied in the standardized Cook-Emerson et 
al situation (1983) are transformed into status relations as 
these are studied in the standardized experimental situation 
developed within the expectation states program, Berger et al 
(1977). 
Lovaglia argued, putting it in briefest terms, that a 
pattern of power and exchange behaviors, in the Cook-Emerson 
situation, that is consistent in its outcomes over a given number 
of decision trials and that is consistent with initial 
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differences in power positions will lead to the formation of 
performance expectations which coincide with these power 
differences. These performance expectations in turn are 
transferred across task situations and become the basis of status 
relations as studied in the standardized experimental situation. 
To describe a process by which this occurs, Lovaglia 
constructs a theoretically based model that makes use of three 
different formulations in the expectation states program. First, 
he identifies the power and exchange behavior in the Cook-Emerson 
situation with the abstract concept of behavioral interchange 
pattern as it appears in the behavior-status theory developed by 
Fisek et al 1991. Behavioral interchange patterns. as described 
by Fisek and his colleagues, emerge from consistent sequences of 
interaction and lead to status tvpifications which are behavior 
based performance expectations. Second, Lovaglia identifies high 
and low bonuses which are allocated in his study to actors in 
high and low power positions with the notions of high and low 
reward levels as they appear in the reward expectation states 
theory, Berger et al 1985. By arguments described in that 
formulation, the allocation of such rewards in themselves leads 
to the formation of high and low performance expectations. Since 
these rewards are allocated consistent with the exchange 
outcomes, they serve as additional bases for the formation of 
performance expectations that coincide with the differences in 
power positions in the situation. Finally, using the theory on 
the evolution of status expectations, Berger et al 1989, the 
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argument can be made that once formed, these performance 
expectations are transferred to a subsequent task situation and 
become the basis of a status order in that situation. 
It is also to be observed that the model which Lovaglia 
constructs takes into account some of the special conditions in 
the situation under which this process is occurring, as for 
example, that the actors start with no prior history, and 
therefore, that they hold no prior performance expectations. The 
model also identifies observational techniques and procedures, 
those used in the Cook/Emerson situation and in the standardized 
experimental situation and in the procedures of the semantic 
differential, which provide information on behaviors and 
reactions that are relevant to the model. 
Status Models of Gender. The Lovaglia research illustrates the 
construction of a model to describe specific events in specific 
situations. Other types of models have been constructed that 
focus on particular phenomena as this phenomena manifests itself 
across different types of situations. This is particularly true 
of status characteristic models that have been formulated to deal 
with race, ethnic, and gender behavior in interpersonal 
situations. 
In a recent examination of status characteristic 
applications to gender, Wagner and Berger 1993b have shown that 
these applications consist of distinct theoretical accounts of 
how status operates to structure gender behavior. Since the 
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focus of this research is to account for a particular type of 
phenomena, i.e., variations in gender behavior in interpersonal 
situations, these accounts are in effect a set of interrelated 
models with each of the models providing explanations of gender 
behavior in a different situation. Thus there is a model to 
describe the emergence of performer and reactor interaction 
profiles in mixed gender groups, Wagner and Berger 1993b; and a 
model that describes the construction of social types such as 
"dominating" and "expressive" persons on the basis of such status 
based behavioral profiles, Gerber 1992, 1993. There is a model 
that describes how the gender typing of tasks determines the 
different status positions that men and women achieve in problem 
solving status situations, Wagner and Berger 1993b; and Dovidio 
et al 1988. There is also a model that describes how men and 
women form different expectations for rewards in distributive 
justice situations, Wagner 1992a, 1992b; and a model, among still 
others, that describes the differences in the behavior of men and 
women in situations where their power and prestige order is 
legitimated as compared to situations in which it is not 
legitimated, Ridgeway and Berger 1986; Ridgeway 1988. 
Several additional things are worth noting about this type 
of theory based modelling and related model building. First, as 
was true in the case of Lovaglia's model, the construction of 
this set of interrelated models involves the simultaneous use of 
a number of different formulations in the theoretical research 
program. In the case of the gender models, these have included, 
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aside from the core status characteristic theory, the theory of 
reward expectations (Berger et al 1985), the theory of status 
cues (Berger et al 1986), and the theory of the legitimation 
status structures (Ridgeway and Berger 1986), among others. This 
highlights an important feature that these models have in common. 
The different parts of a research program provide the theoretical 
resources that are used in the construction of these theory based 
models. 
Second, as is true of single unit models that are 
constructed for specific events in specific situations, the 
individual models in the interrelated set can be evaluated for 
their empirical adequacy. However, the existence of an 
interrelated set of models permits additional evaluations. 
Specifically, it allows us to assess the extent to which the set 
of interrelated models encompasses the full range of situations 
that is of interest to us in studying the particular phenomena. 
Since these models are theory based this criterion also serves as 
an important basis for evaluating the program within which they 
are constructed. 
Tests and Applications. Theory based models also differ along 
other important dimensions. Among these is the consideration of 
how abstract or how concrete are the terms of the theory based 
model. The terms in a model of power and exchange behavior such 
as the one we described above are fairly abstract, whereas the 
terms used to construct a model, say, of mixed gender behavior in 
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a jury setting would tend to be more concrete. Models also 
differ in the simplicity and complexity of the situations they 
represent, and whether these situations are highly controlled or 
involve little or no control. What is of particular interest is 
that models that are abstract, and that are of relatively simple 
and highly controlled situations ("artificial" situations) 
traditionally tend to be those that are used in tests of the 
theoretical formulations in a program. On the other hand, models 
that are concrete, and that are of situations that are highly 
complex and involve little or no control ("natural" situations) 
traditionally tend to be those that are designated as 
applications of the theories in the programs. Without 
questioning the value of this distinction, our analysis suggests 
that insofar as these different types of models are based on the 
theoretical arguments of the program, they each contribute, 
albeit in different measure, to the empirical grounding of the 
program. 
Programs can be assessed through their models which can be 
evaluated in terms of different criteria. Among these is their 
empirical adequacy in representing a specific situation; the 
range of situations, events, and phenomena to which they can be 
applied, and their instrumental utility -- how useful they are as 
a basis for social interventions. Such assessments are an 
important basis of program growth. 
However, our analysis strongly suggests that it is not the 
only basis and that in fact there are multiple sources of program 
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growth. Changes in its working strategies through the 
articulation and refinement of these strategies; attempts to 
realize its theoretical goals through the formulation of 
elaborations, proliferations, and integrations; as well as 
assessments of the empirical adequacy and instrumental utility of 
its theory based models are each involved in determining the 
growth of a theoretical research program. 
V. CONCLUSION 
One purpose of the present paper was to bring together in 
one comprehensive statement scattered developments in our 
understanding of theoretical research programs and their relation 
to theory growth (Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch 1989, 1992; Berger 
and Zelditch 1985, 1993; Zelditch 1991, 1992). We will not 
attempt to recapitulate this statement. But some of these 
developments call for a reconceptualization of theoretical 
research programs. They suggest that a theoretical research 
program is a set of substantive and methodological working 
strategies, a set of interrelated theories that embody these 
working strategies, and a set of empirical models based on these 
theories. This definition differs from earlier definitions 
(Berger 1974; Wagner and Berger 1985; Berger and Zelditch 1993) 
in two ways. First, it explicitly incorporates some elements of 
orienting strategies, though it excludes others. Having 
differentiated working strategies from foundation positions, we 
need to incorporate working strategies into our concept of a 
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theoretical research program if we are to construct a concept 
appropriate as a unit for analysis of theoretical growth. 
Working strategies play an immediate directive role in growth and 
grow reciprocally with the growth of theories. On the other 
hand, the definition still excludes fundamental aims and 
substantive and methodological foundation positions because their 
role is less direct, they change slowly, if at all, and the 
changes that do take place do not seem responsive to the 
assessment of theories. Second, it incorporates theory-based 
empirical models employed in theoretical and applied reasoning 
while excluding the empirical outcomes of such research. Theory-
based empirical models are needed to understand growth because it 
is through them that the theories of a program are linked to 
empirical outcomes. On the other hand, the outcomes themselves 
are excluded because they are not distinguishing features of 
theoretical research programs. Both modifications of our 
definition of a theoretical research program are motivated by the 
objective of defining a unit of analysis most appropriate to 
understanding the growth of theory. The result extends our 
previous multidimensional model in a way that we believe will be 
more useful in conceptualizing the growth of theory that is 
currently taking place in our field. 
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